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ESSAY
Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the
Structural Role of the Supreme Court in the
U.S. Constitutional Democracy
Karl S. Coplan*
The classical rationale for judcial review of the constitutionality of legislative and
executive acts is based on a deterministic assumption about the nature of constitutional legal
rules. By the early twentieth century howeve; American legal realists persuasively questioned
the detenninacy oflaw in general and posited that hdeterminate cases were decided byjudicial
intuitions of fairness. Social science research has discovered that self-identified liberals and
conservatives predictably place different relative values on differnt shared moral intuitions. At
the same time, neurological research suggests that humans and pnmates implement "decisions"
before the cognitive parts of the bram are even aware that the subject has made a decision-
potentially negating the role ofcqgnitive reason in ituitive human decision making
Combinig these three behavioral insights-that of the realist the psychologist, and the
neurobiologist-seems to undercut the classical justification for judicial review by unelected
judges. If intuitive ideology rather than reasoned application of rules controls much judicial
decision making, then the Supreme Court has no more authority to issue biding interpretations
of the Constitution than those branches of government whose ideological leanings are more
directly subject to political controls. Nevertheless, the Supreme Courts structural role as a
potential restramt on unconstitutional government action and as the ultinate arbiter of
constitutional disputes, together with institutional and political restraints on judicial activism,
leaves an essential practical role forjudicialreview in the US. constitutional system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"It is emphatically the province ... of the [courts] to say what the
law is."' So declared Chief Justice Marshall over two hundred years
ago in Marbury v Madson, in an affirmative and enduring statement
of the structural finality of judicial review in resolving questions of
constitutional interpretation in the United States' constitutional
democracy. Yet Marshall's use of the definite article-"the law"-
reflects a certain deterministic assumption about the nature of law that
has not withstood the test of time. While nineteenth-century scholars
and jurists may have largely shared this deterministic vision of the law,
either as a result of natural law assumptions underlying the common
law processes or as a matter of the legal formalism that prevailed by
the late nineteenth century, the legal realists of the turn of the twentieth
century provided a key insight into the nature of the judicial process:
law, it turns out, was not determinate at all. Impeccable legal
reasoning could be used to support more than one outcome in a large
proportion of the cases decided by the appellate courts. According to
the realists, rather than declaring what the law is, courts declare "law,"2
making policy choices in the process. These policy choices are
informed more by each individual jurist's background and sense of
fairness than by formal reasoning from legal rules.
While legal realism may never have caught on with academics
and philosophers as a coherent theory of jurisprudence, its key
insights-that law is indeterminate in many cases and that judges
make rulings in those cases based on a visceral sense of fairness and
justice as applied to the facts of the case-retain wide acceptance
among practicing lawyers and legal academics to this day.! The legal
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. I use quotation marks around the word "law" here because even the concept of
law can, at some level, be indeterminate. Law can mean formal reasoning from rules
announced in judicial precedents and statutes, or it can be more broadly defined as the
universe of socially accepted sources for discovering principles for deciding cases. See
genemily Liam Murphy, Better To See Law This Way, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1088 (2008);
Kenneth Einar Himma, Substance and Method m Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal
Theory, 88 VA. L. REv. 1119 (2002) (reviewing JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH 10 LEGAL THEORY (2001)).
3. See, eg., Mark A. Hall & Ronald F Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of
Judicial Opinions, 96 CALUF. L. REv. 63 (2008) (advancing a unique method of analytical legal
scholarship largely based on the tenets of legal realism); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal
Realism: Toward a Naturalied Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997) (recognizing the
influence of legal realism on legal academia and culture and advocating for greater
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realists were largely concerned with the practical, lawyerly problem of
predicting how a court would rule when presented with a new fact
situation. Yet this approach invites a behavioralist inquiry into whether
the resolution of indeterminate legal problems might nevertheless be
predictable as a matter of human behavior (judges being human after
all). Recent psychological research has posited that a sense of fairness
and justice may be innate and evolved in human nature-that certain
moral precepts are shared across religions, national boundaries,
cultures, and ages. The existence of an innate human sense of fairness
might seem to support the long-abandoned notion of natural law as a
source of legal principles and predictability. The rub is that this same
research shows that while people generally recognize shared principles
of fairness, different people place different relative values on some of
these shared principles. In particular, these studies have shown that,
across cultures, people who self-identify as liberals tend to value the
moral precepts of group loyalty and respect for tradition and authority
less than people who self-identify as conservatives. Because these
different political identifications place different relative values on these
principles, an innate sense of justice common to humans generally
seems also to be indeterminate and an inadequate predictor of judicial
decision making generally.
Moreover, the realists' insight that formal legal reasoning is
indeterminate and that judges make policy choices and apply their
subjective sense of fairness in resolving the indeterminate cases casts
doubt on the fundamental theoretical basis of judicial review in the
United States constitutional system. If judges do not declare the law,
as Chief Justice Marshall articulated it, but rather choose law out of an
indeterminate range of outcomes supportable by legitimate legal
reasoning, basing their choices on idiosyncratic notions of policy and
fairness, then are not judges making legislative choices that more
properly belong with the legislature? If the justification for judicial
review is the inherent judicial function of applying the rule of decision
acceptance of the theory in the realm of jurisprudential philosophy); Victoria Nourse &
Gregory Shaffer, Vaieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New
Legal Theory., 95 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 62 (2009) (outlining a "dynamic new realism" and
recognizing "that law, politics, and society, not to mention markets and governments, cannot
be reduced to one another because they interact simultaneously"); Brian Z. Tamanaha,
UnderstandingLegal Realism, 87 TEx. L. REv. 731 (2009) (describing the pervasive nature of
realism in jurisprudential analysis and describing the theory as a mainstream, nonradical
philosophy); Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner Henry
Fiendly andRoger Traynoron Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BuFF. L. REV 1267 (2009) (analyzing
the self-described decision-making techniques of three preeminent judges and routinely
relying on realist theories to support the adequacy of their various methodologies).
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required by a superior legal document (the United States Constitution,
with its Supremacy Clause) as against an inferior legal document
(congressional legislation), does not this theoretical justification fall
apart in those cases where accepted constitutional legal reasoning will
support more than one outcome, and the judicial choice of outcomes is
based on something other than ineluctable legal reasoning? And if this
judicial choice of outcomes in those indeterminate cases is based on
differing value systems that correlate well with different political
alignments, the inherently political nature of this choice of outcomes
would also seem to argue strongly that these choices be assigned to the
more politically responsive branches of government, and not to
unelected judges.
Yet these political arguments against judicial review would ignore
the judiciary's (and particularly the United States Supreme Court's)
structural role as the final arbiter of constitutional limits on
government action. The Constitution, together with accepted modes of
constitutional legal reasoning, may fail to provide a determinate
answer, and the answer a particular judge or Justice gives in those
indeterminate cases may correlate well with her own political
proclivities (which may be contrary to those of a duly elected
legislative majority). Nevertheless, a constitutional form of
government requires some body with final say over the interpretation
of the Constitution. The alternative-leaving the legislature as the
final judge of its own powers-risks rendering constitutional limits on
government unenforceable. While the Framers may not have been
legal realists, they anticipated judicial review and understood the value
of leaving the final interpretation of the Constitution to judges with life
tenure, who would not have to run for reelection, thus removing
immediate political advantages from consideration in resolving
questions of constitutional interpretation. In doing so, they served a
deeply felt social need for neutrality and finality in resolving the
inevitable political disputes that would arise from conflicts between
sovereign states in a federal system, competing branches of govern-
ment at the federal level, and an empowered citizenry.
In Part II, this Essay explores the competing jurisprudential
theories of formalism and realism, the problems posed by the frequent
indeterminacy of law, and the synthesis represented by legal process
theory. Part In of this Essay explores possible nonformalist
determinants of the judicial decision-making process, specifically the
role of moral intuition and the freedom of will of judges. Part IV of
this Essay then seeks to reconcile the institution of constitutional
184 [Vol. 86:181
US. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
judicial review with a moral intuitionist understanding of legal realism,
based on the structural role of the Supreme Court as the ultimate check
and final arbiter of those disputes not entrusted to the political
branches. Political acceptance of the Supreme Court's resolution of
the 2000 election in its Bush v Gore decision exemplifies political
acceptance of this structural role of the Court even when it acts
without a firm formalist basis.' Finally, Part V of this Essay draws
some conclusions about the relationship between a moral intuitionist's
understanding of legal realism, accusations of "judicial activism," and
the judicial selection process. The Essay then concludes with the
suggestion that the Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of the same-
sex marriage controversy may provide an appropriate test of the
relative strengths of legal formalism and moral intuitionism as
competing descriptions of the Supreme Court's decision-making
process.
II. FORMALISM, REALISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINACY
The idealized popular conception of law is a formalist one. In
this view, law is a set of rules that define enforceable rights and
impermissible conduct and establish consequences for the breach of
rights and standards of conduct. Application of the law to a given case
is an exercise in pure logic: the law is the major premise of a logical
syllogism, while the facts of a given case fit (or do not fit) the law's
syllogistic rule. Thus, in a negligence case, the law states a major
premise: a party who suffers legal damage proximately caused by
another party who has failed to exercise reasonable care is entitled to
recover his damages. The facts provide the minor premise: Jim Jones
ran a red light (breaching his duty of reasonable care) and ran into Sam
Smith, breaking his leg (proximately causing injury to Smith). The
legal conclusion follows ineluctably: Jones must pay damages to
Smith.
Under this view of the law, law and logic dictate one correct,
determinate answer to every legal problem. A judge's sympathies,
prejudices, policy preferences, and ideology play no part in
determining the result in any case: a judge must reach the conclusion
demanded by law's "rules" even if the judge considers the result unfair.
This idealized conception of the nature of law is embodied in the
aphorism that the United States is a "[nation] of laws and not of
4. See 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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men"-that is, our nation is governed by a set of legal rules, not by the
arbitrary whim of individual decision makers.
These determinist assumptions about the nature of law have deep
roots in American jurisprudence. Blackstone's Commentanes on the
Law of England which would have been an essential part of the
education of those of the Framers with legal training, did not admit
that application of law could result' in more than one correct result. In
expounding on the imperative that judges adhere to precedent,
Blackstone admits of an exception where the prior precedent is
incorrect in terms that make clear that law can provide only one
"correct" result:
[T]his rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most
evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to the
divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend
to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.
For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust,
it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not
law.. . ."
The deterministic assumption underlying this passage is clear: if law
permitted more than one correct result, then the overruling of
precedent would constitute a change in the law (a change from one
possible correct result to another possible correct result). By rejecting
the notion that law can change, Blackstone's description of the
common law endorses determinacy. The law always provided one
correct result; it just took a later jurist to recognize that an earlier
jurist's resolution was "incorrect." Blackstone also recounts a
formalist formulation of the concept of law: "lawyers . . . tell us, that
the law is the perfection of reason, that it always intends to conform
thereto, and that what is not reason is not law."'
To be sure, eighteenth-century determinism had natural law
underpinnings as much as it was based on legal formalism.
Blackstone's commentaries explicitly rely on a theistic natural law as
"foundational" law, which common law and legislative acts may not
countermand.! Much has been written about the American Founders'
5. MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXX.
6. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTuNE, COMMENTARIES *69-70 (1800) (footnote omitted).
7. Id. Note that it is not clear whether Blackstone himself accepted this characteri-
zation.
8. According to Blackstone:
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself,
is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this;
186 [Vol. 86:181
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reliance on natural law concepts, particularly in the Declaration of
Independence, which explicitly relies on natural law to justify a
rejection of the colonies' legal obligations to Britain.' Chief Justice
John Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence has likewise been
described as "conclusions from deterministic natural law principles
embedded in either the text or spirit of the constitutional document
when it was framed."o
Natural law is premised on the idea that certain notions of
appropriate conduct and interrelationships are universally shared by
human beings. These notions are seen as appropriate foundational
principles for legal rules governing punishment and compensation.
Natural law precepts are often perceived as God-given; thus
Blackstone considers the Ten Commandments to be revealed divine
law. But natural law need not be theistic; many natural law thinkers
perceive natural law to be intrinsic to the human condition and
universally shared even without divine inspiration."
and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority ... from
this original.
... [Ilt is still necessary to have recourse to reason: whose office it is to
discover ... what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life; by
considering, what method will tend the most effectually to our own substantial
happiness ....
Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation,
depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to
contradict these.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *4142 (footnote omitted).
9. In addition to the recitation that all men "are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights," the Declaration of Independence refers to the colonists' right to
assume "the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle
them." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776). For analysis of the
Founders' reliance on natural law principles, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77-79, 185-88 (1967); MORTON WHITE, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 142-84 (1978); Helen K. Michael, The Role of
Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial
Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rihts? 69 N.C. L. REv. 421 (1991); The Role of
Natural Law h the American Revolution, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1202 (1995) (reviewing JOHN P.
REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
(1993)).
10. Robert N. Clinton, Onginal Understandng, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of "This Constitution," 72 lowA L. REv 1177, 1225 (1987).
11. Eg., STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 19 (1991)
("The basic requirements of an organized social life are the basic principles of the natural
law."), quoted in Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professors Guide to Natural Law and Natural
Rjgts, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 655, 657 (1997); Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31
HARv. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 171, 172 (2008) ("[Pleople possess [rights] simply by virtue of their
humanity ... which, as a matter of justice, others are bound to respect and governments are
bound . .. to protect.").
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By the late nineteenth century, this formalist, natural law concept
of legal decision making was the dominant mode of legal thought in
the United States. Formalism was thought to cabin judicial discretion
and eliminate the influence of politics, ideology, and emotion from the
law. Rather, pure detached logic based on preexisting rules would
provide a neutral answer for every legal question. Christopher
Columbus Langdell incorporated this formalism into legal education,
developing a curriculum for Harvard Law School that substituted the
casebooks and the Socratic method for lectures and treatises such as
Blackstone's Commentaries; students were expected to discover the
preexisting principles of common law by reading the cases and
engaging in Socratic dialogue. The formalists viewed law as a branch
of scientific inquiry; pure reason based on scientific evidence would
lead to one, and only one, correct result. Although based on pure
reason (and not divine revelation), legal formalism continued to
incorporate a form of natural law: legal principles were thought to
preexist individual factual applications. Judges did not declare the
law; rather, they discovered the law. Pragmatism and instrumentalism
had no place in formalist legal thought: legal principles, logically
applied, necessarily prevailed no matter what the consequences.
Formalists sought to organize legal rules by establishing
comprehensive categories of cases. The Supreme Court's antiecono-
mic regulation decision in Lochner v New York2 can be seen as the
high-water mark of the influence of legal formalism. The Court
essentially declared that New York's attempt to regulate the hours and
working conditions in the baking trade did not fall into the "police
power" category, but rather violated substantive rights to "liberty" and
"freedom of contract."" The Court rejected the New York Legislature's
health-based rationale for the regulation, reasoning that the baker's
trade was "in and of itself, . .. not an unhealthy one" leaving the
adjustment of relative economic power between employer and
employee as the only plausible purpose of the legislation-a purpose,
in the view of the majority, that was not within the preexisting logical
category of legitimate state police power. The determinative factor-
that the baker's trade was not "intrinsically unhealthy"-was
presumably determined based on pure rational deduction from
preexisting principles of law.
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. For a discussion of Lochner as a representation of formalist, categorical
reasoning, see MORTON J. HORwiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at
29-30 (1992).
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By the early part of the twentieth century, influential U.S. legal
thinkers began to question the premises of legal formalism, thus
planting the seeds of legal realism. 4 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously observed in his 1881 book, The Common Law, "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience."" This contradicted
formalism's premise that legal decision making was an exercise in pure
rational thought. And, in what was to become the legal realists' critical
insight, Justice Holmes observed that common law reasoning "decides
the case first and determines the principle afterwards.""
Justice Holmes ultimately recognized that common law rules
reflected value-laden policy choices. He gave the example of common
law decisions that allowed no recovery for competitive business injury,
while providing injunctive relief against labor boycotts causing
business injury." In his later writings, he rejected the determinism of
classical legal formalism and acknowledged the legislative character of
judicial decision making: "Behind the logical form lies a judgment as
to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds,
often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding."" Holmes likewise
rejected the notion of determinacy underlying classical legal
formalism, and criticized the idea that legal principles "can be worked
out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct.""
Justice Holmes carried his evolving skepticism with him while a
Justice of the Supreme Court. Recognition that judicial decision
making most often reflected political value judgments more
appropriately left to the legislature, Justice Holmes was more reluctant
than his brethren to disturb legislative judgments. He dissented in
14. As legal historian Morton Horwitz has pointed out, Holmes was by no means the
first legal thinker to question the objectivity and neutrality of natural law-based legal
formalism. Indeed, the codification movement of the early nineteenth century-vigorously
opposed by the organized bar-was largely a reaction to the popular perception that common
law judges indeed "made" the law and that popularly elected legislatures were more
appropriate sources of legal rules than judge-made law. See MORTON J. HORwITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATIONOF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 258 (1977).
15. O.W HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
16. O.W. Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REv. 1, 1
(1870), reprintedin44 HAR. L.REv. 725 (1931).
17. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1894), repnntedn COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 117 (1920).
18. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466
(1897), repnnted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 17, at 181. For an analysis of the
progression of Justice Holmes's thinking about the nature of law and the underlying policy
judgments, see Horwitz, suprdnote 13, at 109-43.
19. Holmes, supra note 18, at 465.
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Locmer, criticizing the majority for seeking to import a political
policy choice into constitutional law, famously arguing that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics."20
Rejecting the absolutism of formalism, Justice Holmes also
adopted a more explicitly open-textured, evolutionary approach to
constitutional judicial review. In Missouri v Holland, he opined:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.... The case
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.... We must
consider what this country has become in deciding what [the 10th]
Amendment has reserved.'
Justice Holmes's legal writings set the groundwork for the legal
realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s. Building on Justice
Holmes's key (but understated) insights, the legal realists rejected the
idea that law provided objective, determinate resolution to all legal
disputes. Rather, the realists posited a substantial class of open,
indeterminate cases-particularly those cases reaching the appellate
courts-in which more than one result was supportable by accepted
legal reasoning. The realists argued that judges responded with
idiosyncratic notions of fundamental fairness to the appeal of the facts
of individual cases, and came up with legal rationalizations for their
opinions after the fact. Professor Karl Llewellyn famously compiled a
list of paired, opposing rules of statutory construction, leading to the
conclusion that, far from being deterministic, common law legal
reasoning could be used to support either outcome in many contested
issues of statutory construction.22
A leading realist, Judge Joseph Hutcheson frankly described the
process of judicial decision making as one of judicial hunch followed
by a legalistic "apologia": "[T]he judge really decides by feeling, and
not by judgment; by 'hunching' and not by ratiocination, [such]
ratiocination appear[ing] only in the opinion."' Leading realist writer
Jerome Frank (later a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
20. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920).
22. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 521-35 (1960).
23. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuidve: The Functon of the "Hunch"
in Judicia/Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274,285 (1929).
190 [Vol. 86:181
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the Second Circuit) generalized from Judge Hutcheson's observation
and posited the following:
The process of judging, so the psychologists tell us, seldom begins
with a premise from which a conclusion is subsequently worked out.
Judging begins rather the other way around-with a conclusion more or
less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion and
afterwards tries to find premises which will substantiate it. If he cannot,
to his satisfaction, find proper arguments to link up his conclusion with
premises which he finds acceptable, he will, unless he is arbitrary or
mad, reject the conclusion and seek another.24
Judge Benjamin Cardozo similarly confessed that judicial decision
making "is not discovery, but creation."25 To the realists, legal
formalism was a pernicious myth and a fairy tale.
Rather than condemning the level of judicial discretion (and
judicial policy making) implicit in this view of the judicial process as
contrary to democratic governance, however, some legal realists
celebrated indeterminacy as an opportunity to bring conscious policy
making into the judicial process in pursuit of progressive social
change. Jerome Frank argued that a realist acknowledgement of the
open-ended nature of judicial decision making should allow more
frank and conscious consideration of the social and economic impacts
of judicial decisions, that judges should do equity in the cases before
them rather than apply law." Karl Llewellyn argued for a "conception
of law as a means to social ends and not as an end in itself," and argued
"' [1]aw' without effect approaches zero in its meaning."2 7  Other
realists, however, were less concerned with changing the nature of
judicial decision making than with improving the lawyers' skill at
predicting judicial responses to idiosyncratic factual scenarios; to
them, legal realism meant a realistic approach to advising clients."
24. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100 (1930) (footnote omitted).
25. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
26. See FRANK, supa note 24, at 157 (arguing judges should be arbitrators doing
equity), 167 (endorsing judges who are aware that all legal rules are fictions and seek to do
justice in each case).
27. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responhing to Dean Pouna'
44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1236, 1249 (1931). See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 167
(William W Fisher, 111, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993) (describing realist
program as "purposive adjudication").
28. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv 809, 839-40 (1935); Holmes, supm note 18, at 458-59. See generally
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supm note 27, at 166 (stating that to realists, the virtue of "real
rules" is to "enable lawyers to advise their clients more [effectively]").
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Legal realism never really caught on in the legal academy. This is
unsurprising, perhaps, as legal realism undercuts the fundamental
formalist premise of the legal academy-that law is a distinct process
of reasoned thought that can be learned (and taught) and used to
analyze legal problems to a distinct conclusion. As a descriptive
theory of adjudication, realism suffered from unprovable assumptions
and lack of rigorous social science methodology." As normative legal
theory, it suffered from theoretical incoherence. By denying that legal
rules developed through legal theory actually determine judicial
decisions (at least in close cases), it undercuts the whole relevance of
normative legal theory (including any normative elements of realism).
Taken at face value, legal realism reduces legal decision making to
pure politics, leaving no reason to study law as a distinct discipline. To
the extent that realists were concerned with predicting judicial
responses, realism was of no use to judges looking for law to apply; it
is no help to tell a judge that the law was merely a prediction of how
she herself would rule in a given case. To the extent that the realists
were suggesting (however accurately) that judicial decision making
was the result of idiosyncratic predilections of individual judges (right
down to the state of the judge's digestive system), legal realism was of
no real use even to lawyers seeking to advise clients about likely legal
outcomes-at least until the individual judge was known. Even with
respect to an individual judge, legal realists did not satisfactorily
explain exactly what factors were determinative in judicial decision
making-whether it was enlightened judicial policy making,
preexisting ideological leanings, or rank political partisanship.
Nevertheless, legal realism did influence United States legal
thought in profound ways. It gave rise to the Critical Legal Theory
movement, which embraced realism's indeterminacy premise and
argued that judicial lawmaking was no more than an instrumentalist
means by which the dominant race, class, and gender maintained its
hold on power and wealth."
29. See Leiter, supra note 3, at 270-75 (introducing a modified version of legal
realism that attempts to mitigate these limitations).
30. For the seminal works of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, see MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM
(1983); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
For concise analysis of the underlying theories and summaries of these works, see Duncan
Kennedy, Legal Education as Taiuing for Hiemrchy, i THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRTIQuE 38 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (1982); J.M. Finnis, On "The
CnticalLegalStudiesMovement"30AM.J. JuRis. 21 (1985).
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Perhaps more profoundly, legal realism (as the antithesis to the
prevailing natural law formalism) gave rise to a synthesis of sorts in
the legal process school of positivism of H.L.A. Hart, Albert Sacks,
and Herbert Wechsler. The legal process school accepted realism's
posit of the partial indeterminacy of law, rejected formalism's natural
law predicates in favor of a positivist definition of law as a construct of
human government institutions, and sought to cabin judicial
arbitrariness through its recognition of the institutional roles and
limitations of lawmaking institutions (including the courts) and
adherence to rules-based precedent based on neutral principles." Hart
emphatically rejected what he called the "rules skepticism" of the
realists. His process theory thus shares with formalism the idea that
legal reasoning (application of rules) is the primary driver of legitimate
judicial decision making.32
Realism also lives on in the political science academy, where,
distinct from their cousins in legal academia, the so-called
attitudinalists posit that (especially at the Supreme Court level)
individual judicial attitudes and policy preferences are a better
predictor of judicial votes than legal reasoning." Indeed, in 1994, one
political science writer asserted that he was not "[aware of one]
political scientist[] who would take plain meaning, intent of the
framers, and precedent as good explanations of what the justices do in
making decisions."34
31. For the seminal works on Legal Positivism, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAw (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (tent. ed. 1958); see also
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pnincioles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv 1
(1959). For concise analysis of these theories and their formation, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK,
LEGAL POSITIvisM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998); David A.J. Richards, Rules, Policies,
and Neutral Prncioles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional
Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1069 (1977).
32. As Hart explains:
[Tihough every rule may be doubtful at some points, it is indeed a necessary
condition of a legal system existing, that not every rule is open to doubt on all
points ....
... [C]ourts have jurisdiction to settle [cases] by choosing between the
alternatives which the statute leaves open, even if they prefer to disguise this choice
as a discovery.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 148-49 (1961).
33. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
34. Gregory A. Caldeira, Book Review, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 485, 485 (1994)
(reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 33).
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And while legal academics may avoid the language of realism in
their writings, the realist premises of indeterminacy and suspicion that
judicial law "declaring" is really judicial policy making continue to
pervade the assumptions of lawyers, judges (in moments of candor),
and even the very academics who dismiss realism as a valid descriptive
theory. It is a clich6 among legal academics "that we are all realists
now."35 Certainly, litigators know that the identity of the judge has a
profound effect on the odds of winning a case, and will make
extraordinary efforts to get their case before an ideologically receptive
panel." Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor, speaking candidly before an
audience of law students, said, the "court of appeals is where policy is
made."" Judge Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recently published a book whose entire premise is
frankly realist: that law is indeterminate in many cases, and that in
such cases, judges make policy choices or rely on intuitions of fairness
to reach results. More importantly, echoing Hutcheson, Frank, and
Cardozo, Judge Posner posits that the process of judicial decision
making consists first of an initial inclination, followed by testing that
inclination against available avenues of formalist legal reasoning. In
other words, the decision comes first, and the rationale comes later.
Judge Posner concludes that the Supreme Court is a frankly political
court, not a court of law, and should be accepted as such."
Intuitive acceptance of the premises of realism persists not only
among legal insiders (practitioners, judges, and academics), but among
the public as well. A 2001 survey of public attitudes about the
35. Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1917 (2005); see Eric J. Segall, The Skeptick Constitution, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1467, 1512 (1997) (reviewing Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V TusHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996)); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest
Domain: Deference, Judicial Review and the Bill of Rihts, 84 IOwA L. REv 941, 953
(1999). See generally BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 21 (2007) ("Realism is
omnipresent in American law schools and legal culture. ). For an essay suggesting
reconvergence of legal realism in the legal academy and the political science academy, see
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New LegalRealism, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 831 (2008).
36. Lawyers routinely go to great extremes to choose sympathetic judges. Prior to
the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 2112 to provide for assignment by lottery, lawyers seeking to
challenge agency rulemaking would post agents with walkie-talkies in the halls of
administrative agencies to inform them when rules were adopted so that their petition could
be the first one filed in a favorable circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (2006). Disputes about
which petition was filed first would turn on fractions of a second. Marshall J. Breger, The
Race to the Courthouse Is Over, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1988, at A23.
37. Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 2d Circuit, Remarks During a Judicial Clerkship
Information Panel at Duke University Law School (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://
www.law.duke.edu/webcast/?match=Sonia+Sotomayor.
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008).
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Supreme Court revealed that, while respondents shared the idealized
vision that the Supreme Court should decide cases without regard to
the ideology or political party of the Justices, substantial majorities
believed that individual judicial ideology (85.1%) and individual
judicial party affiliation (69.9%) in fact had either "some impact" or a
"large impact" on Justices' decisions."
But normative resistance to the realist premise is even more
persistent. The realist premises may seem true, but they cannot be
ight in a normative sense. Few argue that a judicial branch of
government with the power to annul legislation should be ruled by
individual policy preferences and partisan loyalties. Acceptance of the
realist premises of indeterminacy and judicial idiosyncrasy seems at
war with one of the foundations of American constitutional law-the
principle of judicial review. Indeed, without judicial review
constitutional law does not really exist as a legal discipline at all. But
if judges make policy choices, then judges are acting in a political
capacity and would seem to have no institutional or structural claim to
reject the enactments of the more popularly responsive Congress and
state legislatures.
Even more unsettling are the unresolved questions laid bare by
realism's premise: if legal rules in the form of constitutional text and
precedent do not explain judicial behavior, what exactly does? Are
judicial decisions truly rank political choices completely unfettered by
law? What is the source of the decisive judicial "hunch" that several
realist judges have referred to?
The remainder of this Essay will explore the role of moral
intuition in explaining judicial decision making, and the implications
of this role for the structural efficacy (if not legitimacy) of judicial
review in our constitutional system.
III. SEARCHING FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF AN INDETERMINATE
SYSTEM OF LAW: THE ROLE OF MORAL INTUITION AND THE
CONUNDRUM OF FREE WILL
To legal formalists, the realist vision of the judicial process is
something of a nightmare: rather than the rule of law, realist judges
would rule based on personal whim-at best, legislating from the
bench and at worst, arbitrarily deciding cases based on personal
39. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opiion:
Popular Expectations Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL.
BEHAV. 181, 185 (2001).
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partisanship and venality. To borrow from Robert Frost, realist
adjudication is like "playing tennis with the net down."'o There seem
to be no objective rules for assessing the quality, or even the legitimacy
of judicial decision making.4 Realist judging by life-tenured judges
thus appears to be a form of despotism, not a legitimate institution in a
constitutional democracy.
But judging in a realist world is not quite the free-for-all that
realist premises might seem to imply. Several thoughtful authors have
detailed the genuine constraints on freewheeling policy making by
judges. These constraints include the expectation that judges will write
an opinion justifying their decisions based on formal legal reasoning
relying on text and precedent, the possibility of appellate reversal,
judges' reputational concerns (including reputation among fellow
judges, the public, and academics), the moderating effects of
collaborative decision making on appellate panels, and ultimately, the
judge's own self-respect and desire to be a good, impartial judge.42 For
the purpose of considering the Supreme Court's role in reviewing the
constitutionality of acts by other government institutions, however,
most of these constraints are quite weak: Supreme Court Justices in
constitutional cases cannot be reversed (apart from the extraordinarily
difficult and rare process of constitutional amendment) and are
relatively impervious to their reputations among the public, their peers,
and particularly among academics.43 Accounts of the Supreme Court
conference process reveal that there is little collaborative decision
making in the (usually determinative) initial conference vote.'
Supreme Court Justices now delegate much of the work of opinion
drafting to law clerks, blunting the constraints of the need to articulate
conventional legal reasons to support decisions. In any event, the
premise of indeterminacy is that cogent legal reasoning will most often
support more than one unique conclusion, so that the constraints of
cogent opinion writing do not often preclude judicial discretion about
the result.
40. Robert Frost, Address at Milton Academy, Massachusetts (May 17, 1935).
41. See POSNER, supra note 38, at 146-52, for a realist perspective and extended
discussion of the difficulty of establishing objective measures ofjudicial job performance.
42. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS 87-110 (2009); see
POSNER, supra note 38, at 125-58. Note that the "reasoned elaboration" requirement of the
judicial process is a key element of the legal process school's constraints on judicial
politicization. See FARBER & SHERRY, supm, at 44-45; Wechsler, supr note 31, at 15-20.
43. POSNER, supra note 38, at 205.
44. SeeWILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 254-55, 258 (2001).
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This leaves the Justices' own self-respect and desire for judicial
legitimacy as the principle constraint on the raw exercise of judicial
power by Supreme Court Justices. Very few judges are avowed
instrumentalists, self-consciously exercising judicial power to achieve
their personal policy and political preferences. As Judge Posner points
out, practically all federal judges are people who see themselves as
(and strive to be) "good" judges, that is, judges who decide cases
impartially.45 Most judges, presumably including Supreme Court
Justices, will consciously seek to avoid making biased or result-
oriented decisions.
This sort of judicial self-restraint, however, does little to mitigate
or prevent the effects of preconscious or unconscious result biases on
the part of judges. Professor Dan Simon has performed a fascinating
analysis of the Gestalt psychology of judicial decision making.46
Professor Simon posits that the judicial "hunch" is in fact the gelling
of a complex series of coherent sets of premises and inferences in
which the judge considers multiple competing and related premises,
eventually selecting the combination of premises most closely aligned
with her core beliefs to form a coherent result (that is, one with
minimal cognitive dissonance), in the process rejecting those premises
inconsistent with the result reached. At some point, cognitive biases
kick in, allowing the judicial mind (like all human minds) to pay more
heed to those premises that support the nascent conclusion. Legal
reasoning is not irrelevant to this process, but it is not necessarily the
determinative factor, as the coherence of the entire factual "story" of
the case is also important. Legal premises fall into place along with
factual premises in reaching the conclusion. In this way, Professor
Simon suggests, a judge can genuinely believe that the result reached
is the uniquely correct result and write a formalist opinion that admits
of no possible alternative results, even though the result was
indeterminate ex ante. One of Professor Simon's key conclusions is
45. POSNER, supra note 38, at 61-64, 69, 204.
46. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS
L.J. 1 (1998). For other cogent analyses of the cognitive psychology of judicial decision
making, see Edward S. Adams & Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Formalism Debate: Expert
Reasoning, Fuzzy Logic, and Complex Statutes, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1243 (1999), and Dan M.
Kahan, "Ideology in" or "Cultural Cognition of " Judging: What Difference Does It Make?,
92 MARQ. L. REv. 413 (2009).
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that the judge is unaware of this cognitive process and thus unaware of
the process by which she reaches her decision.47
Professor Simon posits that his analysis is valid for those cases
that have "low stakes" for the judicial decision maker-that is, cases in
which the decision maker has no ideological or partisan interest in one
result or another. But one can question whether there are truly very
many cases that are low stakes for the judge-particularly when it
comes to constitutional cases in front of the Supreme Court. While
judges presumably strive to be good, unbiased judges, judges
presumably will also resist reaching results that violate their intuitions
of right and wrong. These moral stakes may or may not be conscious,
but they undoubtedly affect the receptivity of judges to opposing legal
arguments-the unconscious mind will resist accepting coherent sets
of premises that contravene the judge's innate sense of right and
48
wrong.
Professor Simon's analysis thus suggests that realist premises are
at least partially supported by cognitive psychology. This analysis does
not completely reject the role of formalist legal argument and
reasoning, however (and neither do the realists). Rather, competing
formalist legal premises constitute but one of multiple sets of premises
that the judge unconsciously networks, accepts, and rejects in coming
to a judicial hunch. The conscious, rational mind realizes that it has
reached a decision, and, after the fact, attributes that decision to
deliberative, rational decision making based largely on formalist legal
arguments. But the rational mind has not made the decision at all;
rather, the unconscious mind has reached the decision through a
complex process of accepting and rejecting related premises, both
factual and legal. This process is remarkably similar to the process
described by psychology's moral intuitionists, who similarly assert that
moral judgments are formed at an intuitive level based on preexisting
receptivity to certain moral principles, while moral reasoning is
47. Professor Simon's description of this cognitive process is remarkably analogous
to the decision-making process described by Judge Coffin in his book on judging. See
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 253-57 (1994).
48. Professor Simon, in a later article, thus notes, "We have also found evidence that
supports the proposition that coherence effects interact with the decision-maker's preexisting
attitudes, particularly those embedded in the person's enduring value system." Dan Simon, A
7Tird View of the Black Box Cognitive Coherence in Legal Dechion Makang, 71 U. CI. L.
REv. 511, 542 (2004).
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invoked only after the fact to justify a moral response reached at the
intuitive level.49
Indeed, neurological science questions whether the rational,
conscious mind is capable of affecting human action at all. To put it
bluntly, the formalist model of legal decision making depends on the
existence of human free will: a judge rationally weighs the formal
legal arguments, picks the "correct" arguments and rejects the
"flawed" or "incorrect" arguments, and through an exercise of rational
free will, decides the case. One self-described formalist jurist
describes the process as an act of conscious will: "[J]urists make
conscious efforts to focus on the facts and the law, ignoring their own
internal conceptions of right and wrong.""o But neurologists question
whether the conscious mind ever actually wills human action at all. In
a famous set of experiments, Benjamin Libet monitored the brain
activity of subjects who were asked to "decide" which button to press.
What he found was that, as subjects pushed the buttons, the action-
oriented portions of the brain became active before the conscious,
decision-oriented portions of the brain. In other words, the action
came first, and the conscious "decision" to act came later.
Nevertheless, the subjects all subjectively believed that they had made
the decision first, before commencing the action.
Libet's experiments (together with confirmatory follow-up
research by other neurologists) helped reignite the centuries-old debate
about the existence of human freedom of choice." In the legal
49. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment; 108 PSYCHOL. REv. 814 (2001).
50. Timothy J. Capurso, How Judges Judge: Theories on Judicial Decision Making,
29 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 11 (1999).
51. The nature and extent of human freedom of will has fascinated Western
philosophers across the centuries, particularly in relation to the moral responsibilities of
individuals for their actions. St. Augustine, writing in the fourth century, grappled with the
conflict between predestination and the individual autonomy necessary for free will and
moral responsibility AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL (Thomas Williams trans.,
1993). Eighteenth-century moral philosophers Emanuel Kant and David Hume famously
disagreed with each other on the nature of human free will. Hume adopted a version of the
compatibilist view that human action was subject to predetermined cause and effect like all
natural phenomena but that individuals remained responsible for their actions, as human
freedom of action allowed for such responsibility, even if such actions were predetermined.
See David Hume, Of Liberty and Necessity, in AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 83, 86-87 (1963). Kant, on the other hand, postulated the existence of free
will as essential to a priori moral reasoning, relegating deterministic views to the standpoint
of empirical phenomenology, which he found irrelevant to moral philosophy. See IMMANUEL
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON: AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(Lewis White Beck trans., 1949); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D.
Meiklejohn trans., 1924); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
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academy, this renewed skepticism about the existence of human
freedom of choice has renewed scholarly debate about the ethics of
retributive justice-if lawbreakers do not make choices to break the
law, then a retributive theory of justice based on the moral culpability
of human actors loses its justification. But no one seems to have made
a connection between a lack of human free will and the role of the
human participants in a system of justice-that is, if lawbreakers lack
rational free will to conform their conduct to the legal and ethical
norms, why should equally human lawmakers and judges
administering a system of justice be any more responsive to ethical
arguments against retributive justice? Or, for that matter, to formalist
arguments addressed to human reason? Judges, even Justices of the
Supreme Court, are human animals. To be sure, there is a world of
difference between a decision to take a discrete physical action such as
pushing a button and the incremental realization of a dispositive
judicial hunch. Libet's startling conclusion-that action precedes
consciousness of a decision and that the mind nevertheless believes
that the decision occurred first and caused the action-is remarkably
analogous to the realist conception of the decision-making process as
described by writers from Frank and Cardozo on down to Judge
Posner and Professor Simon.
But rejection of human free will is equally inconsistent with the
most cynical version of the realist vision of judicial decision making:
the notion that judges willfully make decisions consistent with their
policy preferences or rank partisan leanings. For ifjudges lack the free
will to implement the rational conclusion of a formalist process of
reasoning, they undoubtedly equally lack the free will to decide cases
in a way that consciously achieves their personal preferences. That
does not mean that personal policy preferences (or result preferences)
are irrelevant to the judicial result-it just means that, consistent with
Judge Posner's idea that judges strive to be good (impartial) judges, the
process by which personal judicial outcome preferences affect decision
making is neither conscious nor willful. Determinism thus makes its
way back into the lawmaking process, not as the determinism of the
(H.J. Paton trans., 1948). For a general discussion of Kant's and Hume's nuanced views on
free will, see Lara Denis, Kant and Hune on Morality, n STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., summer ed. 2009), available at http://plato.stanford.
edularchives/sum2009/entries/kant-hume-morality. The debate between Hume, an empiricist
who believed that moral judgments followed from passion, and Kant, a theorist, who believed
that all moral judgment proceeds rationally from first principles of moral thought, anticipates
the ongoing debates between formalists and realists in the legal arena and between rationalists
and moral intuitionists in the psychology arena.
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legal formalists (who insist that there is one "correct," syllogistic
answer to every legal case), but the determinism of the philosophical
determinists (now supported by neurological science) that finds all
human actions to be deterministic. Under this theory, all human
choices are a physical process in the human brain, of which the
conscious mind becomes aware only after the choice has already been
made.
If judges are thus hardwired to make the choices they do, then
perhaps discovery of the nature of that hard wiring might provide a
better answer to the realists' question of "what really determines a
particular judge's decision in a particular case?" Evolutionary
psychologists posit that human moral intuitions are in fact evolved and
wired into human beings. An individual's moral sense is thus largely
innate. Research on infants as young as six to ten months reveals that
children have an innate sense of fairness; they prefer the shape that
plays a "helper" role in an animation to the one that plays the
"hinderer" role.52 Rudimentary moral intuitions are also observed in
primates, and Darwin himself hypothesized that human moral
intuitions were the result of evolutionary processes in a social species."
This is not to say that all moral intuition is fixed and innate from birth;
rather, psychological anthropologists suggest that human evolution in
the context of social, hunter-gatherer groups leads to innate receptivity
to certain generalizable moral principles, which are then culturally
reinforced or rejected during a child's development in much the same
way that human children acquire a native language."
Moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt has explored the manifesta-
tions of innate morality in the specific context of the moral
disagreements underlying the most contentious Supreme Court cases:
those involving the fundamental political conflicts of the so-called
"culture war" in the United States." He posits that there are five basic
moral intuitions for which human beings have evolved to be receptive:
(1) avoidance of harm/care for others, (2) fairness/reciprocity,
52. Paul Bloom, The Moral Life ofBabies, N.Y TIMEs, May 9, 2010, (Magazine), at
44(L).
53. See Haidt, supra note 49, at 826.
54. Id. at 827; see also John Mikhail, "Plucking the Mask ofMystery from Its Face"
Jwisprudence and HL.A. Hart 95 GEO. L.J. 733, 753-55 n.161 (2007) (reviewing NICOLA
LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM (2004)).
55. See Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice:
Conservatives Have MoralIntuitions that Liberals May NotRecognize, 20 Soc. JusT. RES. 98
(2007).
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(3) ingroup/loyalty, (4) authority/respect, and (5) purity/sanctity."
Haidt finds that these moral intuitions are shared across cultures,
across time, and around the world. And Haidt also suggests, like the
legal realists, that moral judgments are most often based on moral
intuition-this innate grammar of morality-while moral reasoning
(like formalist legal reasoning) is a post hoc rationalization for a
judgment made at a preconscious level."
If these five moral principles were truly innate and universal, then
natural law philosophy and legal positivism, as well as legal realism,
might all be reconciled. Judicial decision making might well be
indeterminate as a matter of formalist legal reasoning but determinate
as a matter of application of innate moral principles to particular social
facts, making these rules both universal and immutable (as natural law
holds) as well as a creation of human institutions (which themselves
are a product of evolutionary biology). It is, however, not quite so
simple. Professor Haidt finds that, although receptivity to each of
these five ethics is universally shared, they are not universally equally
valued. Rather, Haidt finds, individuals who self-identify as political
liberals value the ethics of harm avoidance/care and fairness/
reciprocity more highly than the other three moral intuitions, while
self-identified conservatives value all five ethics more or less equally
(thus giving greater relative weight to respect for authority, group
loyalty, and purity than liberals do)."
To Haidt, this difference in weighting explains the intractability
of the most contentious issues of the culture wars (including the issues
that become constitutional issues before the Supreme Court). Liberals
support same-sex marriage on grounds of fairness and reciprocity and
do not understand contrary arguments (found compelling by
conservatives) based on respect for authority (tradition) and purity
(revulsion against nonprocreative sexual acts). To some conservatives,
support for affirmative action may offend notions of group loyalty that
strike liberals as frankly racist." Punishment for those who disrespect
56. Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph, The Moral Mmd: How Five Sets of Innate
Intuitions Guide the Development of Many Culture-Specific Virtues, and Perhaps Even
Modules, in 3 THE INNATE MIND: FOUNDATIONS AND THE FuTURE 367 (Peter Carruthers,
Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich eds., 2007); Haidt & Graham, supra note 55, at 106-09.
Haidt builds on earlier theorists who posited three evolved moral ethics, those of autonomy,
community, and divinity. Haidt & Graham, supra note 55, at 106-07 (citing Richard A.
Shweder, In Defense ofMoal Realism: Reply to Gabennesch, 61 CHILD DEv. 2060 (1990)).
57. Haidt, supra note 49, at 817-18.
58. Haidt & Graham, supm note 55, at 108-11.
59. This is not to discount the fact that many conservatives oppose affirmative action
on fairness grounds, rather than group loyalty.
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authority and reject group symbols, as by burning flags or refusing to
say the pledge of allegiance, may strike conservatives as morally
appropriate while liberals fail to see any harm that would justify the
punishment. Nor are the process school theorists free of these
cognitive biases; Herbert Wechsler's famous criticism of Brown v
Board of Educationo might be explained as a preference for the
conservative ethic of group loyalty (translated into "freedom of
association") as opposed to fairness/reciprocity ethic given more
relative weight by social liberals (translated into "equality"). The
constitution embodies both principles," and judges resolving
controversies will ultimately resolve the conflicting values through
cognitive processes that result in the least cognitive dissonance for
their own fundamental values.
Haidt's moral foundations theory and Professor Simon's cognitive
analysis together have important implications for understanding
judicial decision making when clashes of values become constitutional
issues. Simon posits that formal legal argument is but one of the many
premises sorted out by the unconscious judicial mind in reaching a
decision. Haidt's analysis would suggest that people in general share a
set of innate moral intuitions; these moral intuitions may themselves
be seen as part of the system of interrelated premises that go into the
unconscious cognitive process of reaching a decision. Simon's
analysis of the cognitive drive towards coherent sets of premises
suggests that a judge will be inclined to reject sets of premises
(including formalist legal argument) that lead to results inconsistent
with any fundamental moral intuitions the judge holds. Haidt similarly
posits that the triumph of moral reason over moral intuition, while
possible, is rare." But formalist legal reasoning does not thus become
inoperative to an intuitionist judicial hunch; after all, precedent and
legal texts (like the Constitution) are quite literally forms of authority,
and rejection of these cognitive premises would presumably offend
Haidt's "authority" precept.
This synthesis is neither purely realist nor purely natural law
formalism. The realists are correct that formalist law is often
indeterminate and that results in such cases will vary with the outlook
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); seeWechsler, supra note 31, at 22-34.
61. The Fourteenth Amendment, of course, explicitly guarantees equal protection,
while a constitutional value in freedom of association has been inferred from the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and the right to petition. See Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
62. Haidt, supra note 49, at 819.
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and makeup of the judges involved. However, the natural law
formalists may have been intuitively correct that judges declaring the
law were in fact channeling some innate principles of justice (or
morality) but incorrect in assuming that these principles were either
God-given or the product of pure reason; rather, they may simply
reflect a shared, evolutionary, and cultural moral intuition.
Unfortunately for the natural law formalists (and consistent with the
realists' key insight), these shared principles of justice (or morality) are
themselves indeterminate: the result in a given case will depend on
how a particular judge is wired to weigh competing innate ethical
principles. As even the most casual students of the Supreme Court
have observed, different Justices will reach starkly different
conclusions when addressing the most contentious issues of
constitutional law (where constitutional values may themselves
conflict with each other). These results, as the attitudinalists have
shown, are better predicted based on the ideological (read, innate
moral) preferences of the individual Justices than by legal argument or
reasoning. Supreme Court Justices reaching diametrically opposite
conclusions will be honestly convinced of their own impartiality.
Intellectually neutral observers will note that these Justices will
support their opposing convictions with impeccable logic and
arguments based on accepted modes of legal reasoning.
As a descriptive matter, the formal predicate for judicial review-
an impartial court applying determinate constitutional law to assess the
legitimacy of actions of coequal branches and federalist states-thus
seems simply incorrect. At the end of the day, the identity (and
ideology) of the judicial decision makers matters-the choice of
ideologically conservative or liberal Justices will affect the result.
Does this conclusion, patently obvious as it may seem, thus deprive
judicial review of its legitimacy in the United States constitutional
democracy?
IV. RECONCILING MORAL INTUITIONIST REALISM WITH JUDICIAL
REVIEW: THE STRUCTURAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
A moral intuitionist brand of realism, then, undermines the
classic John Marshall formalist justification for judicial review in the
United States constitutional scheme. Constitutional law, in particular,
is frequently indeterminate, and the result in any given constitutional
controversy will often depend on the identity of the Justices deciding
the case. The classic notion that the Supreme Court is a nonpolitical
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branch performing the uniquely judicial function of declaring what
"the" determinate law is refuted by all objective evidence. If there is
nothing uniquely judicial about how the Supreme Court resolves
constitutional controversies, then democratic theory seems to require
that the democratically elected branches of government make these
fundamental choices.
Or not. Perhaps it is no more an indictment of constitutional
judicial review as "undemocratic" because judges cannot help making
political policy choices in deciding cases than it is to point out (as
several political scientists have) that Congress in our evolved
democracy is more responsive to the interest of organized lobbying
groups than it is to the will of voting constituents. Indeed, some public
choice theorists posit that collective decision makers like Congress are
structurally incapable of making rational decisions in the public
interest." Few would suggest that acceptance of public choice theory
undermines the legitimacy of Congress in a constitutional democracy.
After all, the theory of the republican form of democracy adopted by
the Framers supports the role of Congress as the democratically
accountable vehicle for implementing public preferences. The fact that
American society, politics, and Congress itself have evolved in ways
inconsistent with the Framers' aspirational theories of republican
governance does not undercut the legitimacy of Congress as a
democratically responsive institution in any fundamental way. The fact
that judicial decisions cannot help but reflect the personal moral
makeup of Justices similarly does not undercut the classic justification
for judicial review in any fundamental way. Just as congressional
representatives should strive to serve their constituents and the good of
the republic, even when against the interests of organized groups that
help finance their campaigns, judges should strive to decide cases
according to formalist legal reasoning even when contrary to their
ideological and moral preferences. Legal formalism is, after all, an
internally consistent theory. As Professor Brian Leiter argues, even the
legal realists were not conceptual rule skeptics-they did not question
the value of determinate legal rules. Rather, they were empirical rule
skeptics; they questioned the practicality of such a system in the real
world.'
63. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance:
Implications ofPublic Choice Theory for StatutoryInterpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988).
64. See Leiter, supra note 3, at 295-99.
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But acceptance of legal formalism even on a theoretical basis
requires acceptance of at least the theoretical plausibility of formalist
legal determinism. This may be a greater leap of faith than that
required to believe that elected representatives will truly represent their
constituents. Law may be subject to description in a series of
syllogisms, but no legal syllogism satisfactorily explains how to
choose among competing syllogisms. It is very hard to find
determinist legal theoreticians in the academy anymore; most legal
theorists accept that law is indeterminate and search for foundational
theories that, they hope, will cabin judicial discretion in applying
indeterminate legal principles.
The formalist determinate justification is not the only
justification for judicial review, however. There is a structural
justification for judicial review in our constitutional system as well-
one that is perhaps more compelling than the formalist reasoning. The
genius of the Constitution is not that it implemented a form of
perfectly representative democracy that precludes judicial policy
making. Rather, the Framers invented a system of government with
competing elements of monarchy (the executive branch), republican
democracy (Congress), and aristocracy (the judiciary), and explicitly
relied on the competition between these branches to prevent usurpation
of power by any one of them."
Indeed, the very premise of a written constitution is that some
questions of governance and even some policy choices are to be taken
off the table of the representative institutions and settled more
permanently. Societies need a referee to settle their fundamental
disputes without resorting to violence. The judiciary has long served
this societal function of providing closure. The legal process school
itself is premised in major part on the institutional role of the
adjudicative process in resolving disputes and making legitimate legal
rules.' Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville long ago observed of American
political culture, "There is virtually no political question in the United
States that does not sooner or later [turn] into a judicial question.'
The more transitory and more political branches of government cannot
provide this sort of closure, as these branches can only settle these
65. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
66. See generally HART & SACKS, supra note 31, at 4 ("[E]very modem society
differentiates among social questions, accepting one mode of decision for one kind and other
modes for others ... .").
67. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 310 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2004).
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disputes until the next election. One of the innovations of the
Constitution was to constitute a judicial branch that was independent
of both the executive and the legislature." Much has been written
about the structural role that the judiciary plays in protecting the
interests of political minorities from abuse by the majoritarian
branches of government;" less has been written about the judiciary's
structural role in providing closure to fundamental disputes among
branches of government or even among factions of society. At least
one commentator has suggested that the judiciary is the most
appropriate branch to resolve interbranch controversies as "the one
institution that is permanent, non-partisan, independent of Congress
and the president, explains its conclusions publicly, has fact-finding
facilities, [and] a long-range viewpoint."" Another commentator notes
that Supreme Court decisions enjoy persuasiveness because of the
structural place of the Supreme Court at the head of the judicial
branch."
This structural legitimacy of constitutional judicial review has
support, of course, in the text of the Constitution itself as well as in
Federalist No. 78. Article Ell of the Constitution, after all, grants
jurisdiction to the judiciary to hear cases "arising under this
Constitution."72 In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton explicitly
endorsed judicial review of legislative acts and gave a structural
justification for it in the following universally cited passage:
68. Colonial and British courts of the eighteenth century were adjuncts of either the
legislative branch or the Crown. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at * 147 (describing the
English government as consisting of two branches: "the one legislative, to wit, the
parliament, consisting of king, lords, and commons; the other executive, consisting of the
king alone"); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right To Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government 91 Nw. U. L. REV
899,920-22 n.82 (1997).
69. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REViEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980)
(role ofjudicial review to protect minorities); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 87-88 (1980) (representation-reinforcing theory of judicial
review); Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic
Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 830-32 (1974); Antonin Scalia, The Doctine of
Standng as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,
894 (1983).
70. James L. Oakes, Hans Lindels Constitutionahsm, 74 OR. L. REV 1413, 1415
(1995) (reviewing INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE HANS LINDE T
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995)).
71. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule ofLaw or the Rule ofPolitics? Harmonizing
the Internal and Extemal Views ofSupreme Court Decision Makang, 30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
89, 104 (2005).
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I
understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the
legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of
attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of
courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to
the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."
Not only does Federalist No. 78 reflect an expectation that the
judiciary would exercise power to declare acts of Congress void, I
would suggest that its author, at least, must have understood that in
exercising this power of judicial review, judges would exercise
discretion in resolving individual cases of constitutional indeterminacy.
For, in a later passage, Hamilton indicates that he understood full well
that law can be indeterminate and that judges deciding cases must
exercise their discretion:
It has been frequently remarked with great propriety that a voluminous
code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with
the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in
the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict
rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in
every particular case that comes before them. . . .7
Thus, in the same breath as he endorses constitutional judicial review,
Hamilton acknowledges that in the absence of a "voluminous code"
setting forth rules "in every particular case" judges will exercise an
"arbitrary discretion."" FederalistNo. 78 thus endorses judicial review
even with a frank acknowledgement that indeterminacy exists in law
and that judges exercise discretion to make law in the face of
indeterminacy.
Judicial review thus derives legitimacy from constitutional text
and the expectations of the Founders even in the absence of formalist
assumptions about the determinate nature of judicial decision making.
It has become one of the structural assumptions of our system of
government. And, judicial and academic predictions to the contrary
73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See Jonathan T Molot, The Judcial Perspective hm the Adnistrative State:
Reconcihng Modem Doctines ofDeference with the Judciaryk Structuml Role, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 19-27 (2000) (arguing that the Framers had a moderately indeterminate view of the
law, which supported the need for an independent judiciary).
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notwithstanding," ten years after the Court's most apparently partisan
decision in Bush, public approval of the Supreme Court remains high
and has consistently exceeded public approval of the elected branches
of government for decades."
Indeed, Bush itself may be the realist example that proves the
structuralist role of the Supreme Court. Conservative Justices voted
against their ideological leanings to vastly expand equal protection
analysis in voting rights cases," apparently motivated by a purely
partisan desire to hand the presidency to the candidate of their ingroup
(their political party). Confounding formalism and legal process
"neutral principles," the per curiam decision suggested that its
reasoning would not apply to future cases because of the
"complexities" of the case. Academic condemnation of the decision
was immediate and nearly unanimous: both for its out-of-character
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as for its activist intrusion into the Article II
process of selecting the president where the constitutional text clearly
puts the responsibility for resolving disputed elections in Congress, not
the Supreme Court."o Justice Stevens confidently predicted that the
legitimacy of the Court would suffer as a result of the decision, in
language hinting at parallels to the Court's infamous Dred Scott v
Sandforddecision."
At the end of the day, the academic criticism of Bush does little
more than prove the realists' first point: law, especially constitutional
law, is indeterminate. While it is easy to point out the inconsistency of
the per curiam's equal protection reasoning with previous positions by
the Justices who joined the opinion, it is harder to say that the
77. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Frank Newport, Trust h Legislative Branch Falls to Record-Low 36%, GALLUP
(Sept. 24, 2010),http://www.gallup.com/poll/143225/Trust-Legislative-Branch-Falls-Record-
Low.aspx; see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 221-33 (2004) (discussing the historically
widespread public approval of even the most controversial high court decisions).
79. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Equal Protection? The Supreme Courth Decision in Bush
v. Gore, FATHOM ARCHIVE, http://fathom.lib.uchicago.edu/1/777777122240/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2011).
80. See, e.g., A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH v GORE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002); VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE
BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND
CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT (2001); BUSH v GORE. THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce
Ackerman ed., 2002); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT
HUACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
81. See 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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reasoning is facially invalid-a point underscored by the fact that the
Court's liberal Justices joined the equal protection reasoning, but
disagreed solely on the remedy. The concurrence's literalist reliance
on its discovery of the Article II clause providing for designation of
electors through means chosen by the legislature is likewise not a
facially invalid form of legal reasoning, and the dissent's emphatic
rejection of this reliance is equally supported by precedent. And the
ultimate alignment of the Justices seems to prove the realists' second
point: choices within the range of indeterminate outcomes in
contested cases will depend on the ideological outlook of the judges.
But, despite this setup for a realist challenge to the legitimacy of
judicial review by an apparently political court, a strange thing
happened once the decision was announced. Even with the control of
the presidency at stake, and having indisputably won the popular vote,
Al Gore conceded the presidency rather than mount a political attack
on the legitimacy of judicial review. Gore could easily have done so
by challenging the electoral votes from the State of Florida when the
votes were presented to Congress, thus seeking to have the House of
Representatives determine the election as provided by the Twelfth
Amendment. It may well be that a crude political calculation revealed
the futility of such an attempt, but with a popular vote victory and the
presidency at stake, it is telling that Gore-and the nation-accepted
the Supreme Court's verdict on the election as final with barely a
whimper.
Indeed, the most compelling defense of the Supreme Court's role
in Bush is not any neutral principle in the majority's exposition of
equal protection analysis of differential means of counting votes, nor in
the concurring Justices' discovery of the "legislature clause" in Article
II, but rather in the important structural role the Supreme Court played
in promptly resolving the election and avoiding a perceived threat of
political chaos if the election were dragged out beyond the meeting of
the electoral college.82 This, incidentally, is the principle justification
82. This perceived threat of electoral chaos may be overstated, of course, as there was
no actual threat to the security or order of the United States at the time the Supreme Court
issued its decision. However, one can hypothesize that in addition to the relatively weak
formalist arguments accepted by the Justices who joined the per curiam decision, the
cognitive premises working in favor of stopping the recount included a prompt resolution of
the election, avoidance of immediate chaos (Haidt's avoidance of harm), and the Justices'
party loyalty (Haidt's ingroup/loyalty premise). That the liberal Justices accepted the equal
protection arguments as well, but differed only in the matter of the appropriate remedy, is
consistent with the high value liberals place on fairness (equal protection and equality of
results) as well as the comparatively weaker value these Justices place on ingroup loyalty
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argued by Judge Posner in defense of the Bush decision in his book,
Brealang the Deadlock."
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND A CHALLENGE
A moral intuitionist understanding of judicial decision making
articulates a noncynical version of legal realism, as it accepts legal
realism's premise that formal legal reasoning is indeterminate without
drawing legal realism's potentially cynical conclusion that judicial
decision making in indeterminate cases consists of nothing more than
deliberate judicial policy choices. Rather, moral intuitionist legal
realism posits that judges act in good faith to make decisions that they
honestly believe are supported by determinate legal reasoning, even
while the unconscious process resulting in these decisions necessarily
reflects the cognitive biases and moral values of individual judges.
While the form and language of constitutional adjudication may thus
be a "[nation] of laws and not of men,"' the substance of constitutional
decision making largely depends on the identities and the moral values
of the Justices on the Supreme Court at any given time.
It follows then, that the Supreme Court is a political court, at least
in the sense that Justices make policy choices in constitutional cases
that reflect differential weighing of competing social and moral values.
It does not follow, however, that constitutional judicial review is an
illegitimate usurpation of the legislative functions of the "more
politically responsive" branches. The Framers, by enshrining
principles in a written constitution and endorsing judicial review of
legislation, intentionally took certain issues off of the legislative-and
state-tables, contemplating a judicial check on transient majorities.
The Constitution, especially as amended by the Bill of Rights, perhaps
contains more indeterminacy than was understood by the Framers, but
Federalist No. 78, at least, reflects an understanding of indeterminacy
in law and the reality that judges would apply discretion in cases of
indeterminacy. Acknowledgement of this reality-particularly if the
discretion is not completely arbitrary but rather reflective of widely
shared but not equally weighted moral values-does nothing to detract
from the structural role of the Supreme Court as a check on the
political branches and as a penultimate arbiter of divisive social issues.
(party loyalty). A purely partisan Democratic position would be to reject the equal protection
arguments and avoid legitimizing any portion of the per curiam decision's reasoning.
83. RIcHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
84. MASS. CONST., pt. 1, art. XXX.
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It also follows that accusations of judicial activism from either
side of the ideological divide are bankrupt. As has been persuasively
argued elsewhere," judicial activism seems to mean nothing more than
an outcome in a legally indeterminate case in which the Supreme
Court overturns action by a legislature or a state and the accuser
disagrees with the result. Under this definition, "judicial activism"
includes such universally condemned decisions as Lochner and Dred
Scott, but it also includes currently applauded decisions like Brown, as
well as liberal landmarks such as Roe v Wade and more recent
conservative triumphs such as Prtz v United States, New York v
United States, District of Columbia v Heller, and Citizens United v
Federal Election Commission." Judicial activism thus defined also
includes such foundational Marshall Court decisions as Marbury itself,
which struck down portions of the Judiciary Act of 1789; McCulloch
v Marylanc which struck down a Maryland-legislated tax on the
national bank and established the so-called implied powers
interpretation of the necessary and proper clause; and Gibbons v
Ogden, which established the foundation for the modem commerce
power while voiding a New York-legislated licensing scheme for
steamboats."
Indeed, it was the open-textured, purposivist-and ultimately
indeterminate-approach to constitutional interpretation of the
Marshall Court in these latter cases that opened the door of
indeterminacy a little wider than a strict, textual approach might have
and ultimately enabled the evolution of a policy-making Supreme
Court. Justice Thomas may pine for an eighteenth-century model of
federalism-and may even be willing to try to turn back the clock to
limit the application of the commerce power to regulating imports and
exports among states"-but other conservative Justices of the current
Supreme Court have all accepted the coevolution of industrial
85. See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 38-47, 229-36 (2006).
86. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); DredScot4 60 U.S.
393 (1856).
87. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
88. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
349-55 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
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technology, a national economy, cultural diversity, and a purposive,
values-weighing constitutional law doctrine, at least to some extent.89
But to say that the Supreme Court makes policy choices that
reflect individual moral values is not to say that Supreme Court
Justices enjoy the "arbitrary discretion" of Hamilton's Fedemist No.
78. The constraints on judicial discretion are real, even if weakened at
the Supreme Court level. While the Supreme Court from time to time
pushes social change ahead of social consensus (as in Roe and
Brown), and at other times constrains social change even after political
consensus is reached (Locmer), many commentators have noted that
the Supreme Court's value imposition is never drastically far from the
emerging social consensus."o While the Court may have declared a
right to be free from punishment for same-sex consensual intimacy in
Lawrence v Texas, this right is not out of the mainstream of American
views, and Justice Scalia's dissent to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Court is nowhere near to extending that right to incestuous
relationships, polygamy, or bestiality."
Moreover, the political branches enjoy some ultimate oversight
over the court, curbing judicial adventurism. The constitutional
amendment process, though rarely evoked and difficult to implement,
discourages decisions that will be universally condemned. The threats
of court packing, jurisdiction curbing, impeachment proceedings, and
outright disobedience by political actors, though rarely implemented,
are also effective constraints on "arbitrary" judicial discretion.92
Presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt on down have learned that
the most politically expedient way to effect incremental change in
89. See Antonin Scalia, Onginalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv 849, 864
(1989). Justice Scalia has described himself as a "faint hearted originalist" who would allow
originalist principles to yield to stare decisis.
90. It has long since been noted that "th[e] [S]upreme [Cou]rt follows th[e ele]ction
returns." FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONs 26 (1901).
91. See 539 U.S. 558, 590, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Haidt uses the
example of consensual adult incest as an example of universal moral revulsion at conduct that
cannot be shown to have any objective harm. Haidt, supm note 49, at 814.
92. See Tom Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the
Stoies We Tell Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 984-1000 (2009) (discussing examples of
"popular constitutionalism" resistance to Supreme Court decisions, including the
impeachment of Justice Chase, President Jackson's refusal to implement the Cherokee Nation
decision, and President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan); see also L.A. Powe, Jr., Are
'the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEx. L. REv. 855 (2005)
(reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDIcIAL REvIEw (2004)) (reviewing twentieth-century incidences of popular resistance to
Supreme Court decisions, including school desegregation, school prayer, and abortion rights
decisions).
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constitutional interpretation is through the appointment power. The
structure of the Article II Appointments Clause together with the
Article E Life Tenure Clause allows for political influence on the
general ideological direction of the Supreme Court while ensuring
judicial independence. To be sure, growing political acknowledgement
of the realist premise that Supreme Court Justices make law has led to
politicization of the process, but this politicization together with
observance of the sixty-vote cloture rule generally tends to assure that,
at least in their publicly stated positions, Supreme Court justices will
not be terribly far from the current ideological center." Individual
judges' ideologies clearly matter to judicial results, and the ideologies
of Supreme Court candidates have quite properly become matters of
debate in the appointment process; this is part of the constitutional
structure that keeps the center of the Court not too distant from
contemporary moral values.
And judicial restraint has become the new rallying cry for the
political process of appointing Supreme Court Justices, albeit a self-
serving rallying cry given the ideological relativity of the definition of
judicial activism. At some level, the choice of Justices who are
assertive in their ideology and likely to garner an "activist" label from
their ideological opposites is itself a political choice about the kind of
Supreme Court the political consensus desires. The premise of this
Essay is that it is impossible to eliminate judicial value-imposition in
the context of Supreme Court review of constitutional challenges. But
if judicial restraint-that is, moderation in judicial value-imposition-
is truly to be desired, then a realist, moral-intuitionist understanding of
the judicial decision-making process might provide some insights into
the kind of personal qualities likely to promote judicial restraint and
moderate judicial value-imposition.
Some of these qualities are obvious. The moral intuitionists have
observed that high intelligence correlates with an ability to resist moral
judgments based on pure intuition and to apply moral reasoning
93. ButseeEmily Bazelon, SorryNow? WhatDo the Liberal andModerateLawyers
Who Supported John Roberts' Nomination Say Today? SLATE MAG. (June 28, 2007),
http://www.slate.com/id/2169344/; Adam Cohen, Editorial, Last Term Winner at the
Supreme Court: JudicialActivism, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A16; Editorial, The Courth
Aggressive Term, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5, 2010, at A16; Michael Doyle, WhokActivist Now? In
Election Spending Case, Conservatives, McCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/01/21/82798/whos-activist-now-in-election.html; Edward
M. Kennedy, Roberts andAlito Misled Us, WASH. PosT, July 30, 2006, at BO 1; Stuart Taylor,
Jr., The End ofRestrant: Alito, Roberts, and Judicial Modesty, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 2010, at
16.
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instead.94 It follows that the more intelligent jurists will also be more
able to resist value judgments based on moral intuition and follow
formal legal arguments instead. Other qualities associated with likely
judicial restraint might be inferred, such as general respect for
authority (one of Haidt's conservative moral values), for adherence to
precedent and authoritative text is itself a form of respect for authority.
This might suggest that, in general, conservative judges should be less
activist than ideologically liberal judges (who place less value on
respect for authority and tradition), but this characteristic may itself be
counterbalanced by conservatives' relative overweighting of ingroup
/loyalty values; for a conservative justice may be instinctively more
inclined to decide cases in favor of her political party-witness
Bush-or other group identity. Liberal thinkers' lower valuation of
group loyalty may, on the other hand, equate with greater impartiality
and open-mindedness in considering the interests of outgroups and
political minorities-the structural role of judicial review championed
by John Hart Ely, among others. The ideal moderate jurist might then
be one who combines a strong sense of respect for authority
(receptivity to authority-based arguments) and a weak sense of ingroup
loyalty, together with personal qualities of intelligence and the ability
to defer gratification-if such a person exists.
The natural tendency of the judicial selection process, however,
may unfortunately favor judges with a strong sense of ingroup loyalty,
as service and loyalty to political party are important factors in the
selection process.95 The selection process has also recently favored
practicing litigators for initial judicial appointments. While this may
properly bring real-world pragmatism to the bench,96 this preference
may also promote an activist bench. For, rather than a tendency to
defer moral judgment, litigators are conditioned by habit to focus on a
desired result first, then to deploy the tools of formalist legal reasoning
to achieve that result-the very definition of a more activist judicial
approach."
94. See Haidt, supra note 49, at 823-24; cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 73
(observing that jurists would have to be very smart to know the vast body of codes and
precedent necessary to limit arbitrary discretion). Haidt posits that high intelligence may also
be associated with the ability to defer gratification. See Haidt, supra note 49, at 823-24
(citing Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel & Philip K. Peake, PredictingAdolescent Cognitive and
Self-Regulatory Competencies from Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identi ying
Diagnostic Conditions, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 978 (1990)).
95. SeeFARBER& SHERRY, supra note 42, at 116-17.
96. Id.
97. Note that Haidt describes the moral judgment process in these terms-one
exercising moral judgment is more like a lawyer than a judge. Haidt, supro note 49, at 814.
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Moral intuitionism may also support the value of diversity in a
collegial body such as the Supreme Court. Several commentators have
pointed out the value of collegiality as a restraint on judicial decision
making;" Professor Haidt's article on moral intuitionism also points
out that diverse perspectives at the stage in which an issue is framed
affects moral reasoning and may limit the tendency of moral intuition
to adopt the framing and conclusions of members of the ingroup."
Group-think inherent in a body of like-minded individuals reinforces
idiosyncratic views. Professor Cass Sunstein performed a fascinating
study on the results of ideologically diverse and ideologically
conforming courts of appeals panels and concluded that the presence
of just one judge with a different ideological makeup dramatically
altered and moderated the results as compared to three-judge panels
that were ideologically pure.'" Justice Sotomayor's choice of phrasing
may have been unfortunate when she announced (well before her
nomination to the Supreme Court), that "a wise Latina woman with
the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a
better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life"' but
she may properly be intuiting that a diverse panel of judges
representing different ethnic and social groups within American
society will be more likely to reach decisions in indeterminate cases
that reflect the moral mean of American society rather than one
extreme or another.
The thesis of this Essay is that individual moral intuition plays a
role at least as important as rule-based legal reasoning in the decision-
making process of Supreme Court Justices engaged in constitutional
judicial review. Like most theses in legal academia, this proposition is
endlessly debatable and absolutely unprovable. The cognitive premise
of this thesis is that judges themselves are unaware of the exact process
by which they reach decisions, so even an interview with a perfectly
candid and introspective jurist would not settle the question. No judge
is going to allow electrodes to be attached to her brain during the
98. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 42, at 91; POSNER, supra note 38, at 32-33,
143, 256; Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Makig, 151 U.
PA. L. REv. 1639 (2003).
99. Haidt, supm note 49, at 823.
100. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts ofAppeals: A Prelnilnary Investigation (U. Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 198, 2003).
101. J. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judget Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87
(2002), reprinted i N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/
politics/i 5judge.text.html?pagewanted=all.
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cogitative process to allow scientific examination of the relative
activity of the moral intuition neurons and legal reasoning neurons,
even if such an experiment were possible.
Nevertheless, some thought experiments are possible to assess
the relative weight of moral intuition and formal legal reasoning in a
values-fraught constitutional controversy. A district court in California
has recently struck down California's Proposition 8, amending the
California constitution to forbid the state from recognizing same-sex
marriage, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
Equal Protection, as well as being an unsupported denial of the
fundamental right to marry.'O2 This issue is likely to make it to the
Supreme Court within the coming years. Proponents of a Wechslerian
"neutral principles," rules-based approach to equal protection analysis
have long read Brown to require color blindness in law (absent
satisfaction of strict scrutiny), thus rejecting relativist remedial
measures such as affirmative action.'o3 The gender discrimination
corollary, of course, is that law must be gender-blind, or satisfy so-
called "heightened" scrutiny." Formalist neutral principles would
seem to demand that those who subscribe to color-blindness in race
discrimination law must apply heightened scrutiny to the facial gender
discrimination of Proposition 8: under Proposition 8 a legal disability
turns on the gender of those subject to its prohibition.
The conservative wing of the current Court has accepted and
endorsed the color-blindness formulation."' Under the gender-
blindness corollary, Proposition 8 would be subject to heightened
scrutiny regardless of whether one gender or another-or even some
other classification entirely-is being benefited or burdened by the
discrimination."' Without pretending to forecast the results of such a
102. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
103. See Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment ofRacialMinonties, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1; William Van Alstyne, Rites
of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv 775 (1979);
Wechsler, supra note 31, at 31-35.
104. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-603 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (implicitly applying heightened scrutiny); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 656 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (endorsing gender-blindness standard for Title VII and
an analogous equal protection analysis); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Loving v Viginia from same-sex
marriage on grounds that antimiscegenation statute was based on white supremacy).
105. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
106. Note that Virginia argued in Loving that equal protection did not apply because
both blacks and whites were equally disabled by the antimiscegenation law from marrying the
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value-laden analysis, neutral principles and formal legal reasoning
would demand that these same Justices subject Proposition 8 to
heightened scrutiny, searching for an "important governmental
purpose" with means "substantially related" to that purpose.
We may eagerly await the results of this thought experiment.
other race. The Court rejected this argument, supporting a "color-blind" view of equal
protection. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967). Obviously, more than a glancing
exposition of the constitutional issues raised by Perry v Schwarzenegger is beyond the scope
of this Essay. For good treatments of the facial, gender-based, equal protection argument, see
Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns'" Consdtutional Sex
Discrimnlation Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv 1447 (2000); Mark
Strasser, Equal Protection at the Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits, and Facial
Neutrality, 42 ARIz. L. REv 935 (2000); Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping hn Equal
Protection Doctrine: Reframmg the Exclusion of Women from Comba4 57 ALA. L. REv 303
(2005).
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